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Influence Operation Trends Reshaping Spycraft

Influence Operation Trends Reshaping Spycraft

Writer: John Fullerton
John Fullerton
5 days ago
6 min read

A forged document used to be enough to start a rumour. Now a convincing voice recording, a network of apparently ordinary accounts and a well-timed leak can do the same job before breakfast. The most consequential influence operation trends are not replacing classic espionage tradecraft. They are giving it greater reach, speed and deniability.

For thriller readers, this matters because the real contest is rarely between obvious heroes and obvious villains. It is about who can shape the evidence, corrupt the information environment and make a target doubt colleagues, institutions or even their own memory. The machinery has changed. The human weaknesses it exploits have not.

Influence operation trends are becoming harder to see

An influence operation is a planned effort to alter perceptions or behaviour for a political, commercial or strategic purpose. It may use truthful material, selective truth, stolen information or outright fabrication. The point is not merely to persuade. It is to shift the terms on which people decide what is real.

The first trend is fragmentation. Earlier propaganda often carried the stamp of a state broadcaster, party newspaper or ideological front. Modern campaigns can be broken into small, apparently unrelated acts: an anonymous post, a compromised local website, a private messaging group, a doctored clip and a sympathetic commentator repeating a useful line. Each item can look trivial. Their combined effect is not.

This is strategic deception conducted at scale. The audience need not believe every claim. It may be enough to leave them cynical, exhausted or unable to distinguish an official correction from another attempt at manipulation. A public that concludes everyone lies is easier to influence than one that trusts a single falsehood.

The second trend is deniability by design. Operators increasingly use cut-outs, commercial marketing techniques, criminal intermediaries and online personas whose apparent politics are carefully chosen. A campaign may borrow the language of a genuine grievance rather than invent one. That makes attribution difficult and makes a blunt official response look defensive.

AI changes volume, not human intent

Artificial intelligence has made cheap imitation more persuasive. Synthetic portraits can furnish invented identities. Language models can produce hundreds of versions of a message, tuned to different communities. Audio and video manipulation can create a moment of panic before verification catches up.

Yet the danger is often overstated in the wrong way. A poor deepfake may be exposed quickly; a real photograph captioned falsely can travel further. AI does not eliminate the need for judgement, access or cultural knowledge. An operator still needs to understand who is trusted, which anxieties are live, and what timing will make a message stick. Those are human intelligence problems.

That is why empathy remains central to HUMINT, or human intelligence. Empathy is not kindness, nor is it approval. It is the disciplined ability to see the world as another person sees it: their vanity, fear, professional resentment, loyalty and private compromise. A source may betray an organisation for money, ideology, status, revenge or because someone finally listened. The best technical collection in the world cannot fully substitute for that insight.

This distinction gives the finest espionage fiction its force. Eric Ambler understood that ordinary people can be manoeuvred into dangerous spaces by pressure and miscalculation. Len Deighton made bureaucracy, class and professional ambition part of the intelligence landscape. Mai Jia’s fiction is alive to codes, institutions and the isolation of those trapped inside them. The technology dates, but the moral mechanics do not.

Data is the reconnaissance ground

Another decisive trend is the fusion of surveillance data with influence work. Programmes disclosed over the past two decades - including PRISM, a United States National Security Agency system for collecting specified internet communications under legal authorities, and XKeyscore, an analytical system associated with intercepted internet data - showed the scale at which digital traces could be searched and correlated.

The lesson is not that every state sees everything. It does not. Collection is constrained by law, access, language, storage, analytic capacity and the sheer mess of human behaviour. But data can reveal relationships, routines, interests and vulnerabilities. Combined with commercially obtained information and material scraped from public platforms, it permits unusually fine-grained targeting.

Trailblazer and Stellar Wind, both associated with post-11 September United States surveillance controversies, also remain useful reminders that intelligence capability creates political and legal pressure. Secret collection tends to expand when leaders fear they lack warning. The inevitable question is who controls the collectors, and whether oversight can keep pace with technical ambition.

For an influence operator, personal data is not simply a way to sell trainers or holidays. It can identify a community organiser, a disaffected official, a useful conspiracy entrepreneur or a person susceptible to coercion. The target may never know they were selected. That is one reason digital literacy should include an old-fashioned instinct: ask who benefits from your indignation.

Cyber intrusion and the politics of the leak

Cyber operations and influence operations increasingly work as a pair. One obtains material; the other gives it a story. An email cache can be authentic yet framed dishonestly. A genuine internal argument can be presented as proof of corruption. Documents may be released in stages to sustain attention, with forged additions mixed into a larger body of truth.

This is more effective than a simple lie because it forces journalists, officials and voters to spend their time checking, denying and arguing. The campaign gains ground through tempo. It exploits the gap between the speed of publication and the slower work of verification.

The failure of Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, to achieve key expectations in Ukraine during the opening phase of the 2022 invasion is a cautionary example of intelligence distorted by politics. Reporting suggested assumptions about rapid compliance and elite weakness did not match reality. The broad lesson applies beyond that conflict: when a service tells its political masters what they wish to hear, vast technical resources cannot rescue bad judgement.

Old tradecraft still decides the hard cases

For all the attention paid to bots and algorithms, penetration remains valuable. A mole inside a party, newsroom, company or security organisation can supply context that stolen data cannot. A double agent can feed an adversary material designed to confirm its existing assumptions. An illegal - an intelligence officer operating under a constructed identity without declared diplomatic cover - may spend years building the credibility required to reach a valuable circle.

These methods are slow, expensive and risky. They also demand patient case officers, secure communications and constant testing of a source’s motivation. The romance of the lone master spy obscures the administrative labour: checking a legend, maintaining compartmentation, assessing deception and deciding whether a source is being run by someone else.

Ben Macintyre’s A Spy Among Friends remains a sharp account of how loyalty, class confidence and institutional blindness can shelter betrayal. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin’s The Mitrokhin Archive demonstrates the bureaucratic reach of Soviet intelligence, while Owen Matthews’ An Impeccable Spy is a compelling study of Richard Sorge and the cost of extraordinary access. For a wider institutional view, Keith Jeffery’s MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service and Richard J. Aldrich’s GCHQ are useful correctives to cinematic fantasy.

The real objective is distrust

The most sophisticated campaigns do not always seek conversion. They seek division inside an alliance, suspicion between citizens, or paralysis in a decision-making system. They can amplify a genuine scandal, weaponise a minor error or encourage rival groups to see every compromise as treachery.

That makes defensive messaging difficult. Governments that dismiss every awkward question as hostile influence damage their own credibility. Platforms that remove material without explanation feed claims of censorship. The answer is neither naïveté nor panic. It is transparent evidence where possible, careful attribution where justified, independent reporting and institutions willing to admit mistakes before an adversary makes them impossible to hide.

For writers, influence operations offer something richer than a convenient plot device. They expose character. Who leaks because they believe they serve a cause? Who accepts a manipulated file because it confirms a private prejudice? Who recognises the lie but passes it on because it is useful? Those questions belong as much to the world of Geoffrey Household, Ted Allbeury, Charles Cumming, Mick Herron and Alma Katsu as they do to the intelligence services.

The next false narrative may arrive dressed as a revelation, a joke or an irresistible piece of outrage. Treat urgency as a warning sign, not proof. The first act of resistance is simple: pause long enough to ask what story you are being invited to believe, and who has arranged the invitation.

 
 
 

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